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1. Introduction  
On December 11, 2005, DuPont announced its merger with Dow to form DowDupont. 
Eighteen days later, DuPont initiated a layoff of 28% of its workforce at the headquarters. 
According to a news article, “... DuPont’s layoffs are expected to take a toll on local 
restaurants, grocery stores, retailers and home sales as families impacted by the job cuts 
curtail spending or leave the area entirely...”2 This example indicates that while M&As 
may improve corporate efficiency through workforce restructuring, they may also impact 
other economically related firms in the local area. Although prior literature has extensively 
studied the effect of M&As on the labor force of target firms, the research on the potential 
externality of M&As on the local labor market remains scant.3 In this paper, I investigate 
the spillover effect of M&As on target firms’ local labor markets.4 
For empirical analysis, I examine how M&As in the manufacturing sector affect 
employment growth in the local non-tradable sector. This approach can be justified for 
several reasons. First, although employment in the U.S. manufacturing sector has been 
decreasing for decades, it has received fresh public attention in recent years because of its 
potential profound influence on society. For example, recent studies show that the loss of 
manufacturing jobs has contributed to the polarization of U.S. politics in recent elections 
(Che et al., 2016; Jensen et al., 2017; Freund and Sidhu, 2017; Autor et al., 2019). Second, 
the manufacturing sector usually relies on national or global demand (Adelino et al., 2017). 
Therefore, M&As in the manufacturing sector are likely to be driven by local economic 
 
2 For more details, see “Depressing Atmosphere Envelops DuPont as Layoffs Begin,” The News Journal, 
January 4, 2016. https://www.delawareonline.com/story/money/business/2016/01/04/dupont-workers-
learning-their-fate-today/78255924/. 
3 See Li (2012), John et al. (2015), Ma et al. (2016), Lagaras (2018), and Arnold (2019). 




shocks. Studying M&As in the manufacturing sector helps mitigate the concern that 
unobserved factors may drive M&A decisions and local employment growth 
simultaneously. Third, the manufacturing sector is generally labor-intensive (Bureau of 
Labor Statistics 2017), and labor force restructuring is usually a key cost reduction method 
for merging firms after deal completion (Maksimovic et al., 2011; Li, 2013). Therefore, 
M&As in the manufacturing sector often result in post-merger downsizing, which is the 
source of the spillover effect I analyze.5 Finally, I analyze the employment growth in the 
non-tradable sector. As the non-tradable sector is primarily driven by local consumer 
demand, the employment change I measure is less likely to be confounded by aggregate 
shocks to national income (e.g., Moretti, 2010; Mian and Sufi, 2014; Giroud and Mueller, 
2017).  
Following previous studies (e.g., Maksimovic et al., 2011; Tate and Yang, 2016; 
Lagaras, 2018), I hypothesize that M&As represent employment shocks at the target firms, 
and hence, focus my empirical analysis only on the target firms. In Appendix A1, I present 
a simple theoretical model to illustrate how M&As in the manufacturing sector may affect 
employment growth in the local non-tradable sector. The model indicates that a merger can 
reduce aggregate employment and total labor income in the manufacturing sector. The 
reduced labor income in the manufacturing sector results in lower consumer demand for 
the non-tradable sector goods and services. As a result, the non-tradable sector is forced to 
cut production and labor inputs. Thus, the employment shock in the manufacturing sector 
spills over to the non-tradable sector.  
 




Before testing the empirical implications of the model, I use establishment-level data 
to confirm the effect of M&As on employment at the target establishments. Using a 
difference-in-differences test, I find that establishments that belong to M&A targets and 
have their headquarters located in the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) experience an 
additional 15.3% decline in total employment level compared to the matched control 
sample. This finding is consistent with the previous studies by Li (2013), Lagaras (2018), 
and Arnold (2019), and provides support for the following tests on the potential spillover 
effect.  
However, an M&A must be substantially large to have a major impact on the local 
area. Therefore, I follow Bhattacharyya and Nain (2011) to identify MSAs that experienced 
a significant jump in merger activities in a specific quarter (henceforth referred to as M&A 
Events). After identifying these M&A Events, I use data from the U.S. Census Quarterly 
Workforce Indicators (QWI) and estimate an MSA-quarter panel regression. I find that, on 
average, an M&A Event is associated with a 34-basis-point lower annual employment 
growth in the local manufacturing sector for the next three years. This represents 
approximately a one-third drop from the unconditional mean of the manufacturing sector 
employment growth.  
Moreover, lower employment growth is not restricted to the manufacturing sector. 
Tests with the non-tradable sector show that the annual employment growth rate in the non-
tradable sector is 10.9-basis-point lower after an M&A Event in the local area. Given that 
the non-tradable sector is primarily driven by local demand (e.g., Moretti, 2010; Mian and 
Sufi, 2014), my finding suggests that M&A Events are associated with a negative spillover 




envelope calculation suggests that one job loss in the manufacturing sector after an M&A 
Event is accompanied by 0.58 potential job losses in the local non-tradable sector.  
The main findings of this study are robust to a variety of additional tests. To address 
the concern that other confounding factors may drive the lower growth rate in the non-
tradable sector, I repeat the baseline regression with “false” M&A Event dates. If the 
reduction in employment is driven by industry trends or aggregate economic conditions, 
then M&A Events with completion dates “falsely” set three years before the actual dates 
should have similar effects as the actual events. However, the placebo test fails to replicate 
the same pattern as the baseline results. The results are also robust when I exclude 
overlapping M&A Events or define M&A Events using alternative measures. I further test 
the robustness by excluding sample periods after 2007 to address the concern that the 
baseline results are driven by the Great Recession, which not only decreased consumer 
demand but also increased industry restructuring activities. Finally, I control for the impact 
of import competition from China on local areas to address the potential confounding effect 
of foreign competition. The empirical results consistently support the spillover effect of 
M&A Events in all robustness tests.  
One key identification challenge is that unobserved local economic shocks could cause 
an MSA to experience an M&A Event and reduce local employment growth 
simultaneously. To address this concern, I construct a measure to capture the exogenous 
variation in the probability of an MSA experiencing an M&A Event. Prior studies have 
shown that firms with lower valuations are more likely to become targets in corporate 
takeovers (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003; Edmans et al., 2012). Similarly, undervalued 




Viswanathan, 2004; Rhodes-Kropf et al., 2005). When a national shock hits a specific 
manufacturing industry and reduces the industry valuation, the industry is more likely to 
become a target industry for M&As. At the same time, some regions are hit harder than 
others because their preexisting economic structure leaves them more exposed to industry 
valuation shocks. Therefore, the identification strategy rests on the idea that areas with 
higher average valuation should have a lower probability of experiencing M&A Events.6 I 
follow the spirit of existing literature and interact the preexisting composition of an MSA’s 
manufacturing sector with the sector’s aggregate valuation shock to predict the exogenous 
variation in the probability of an M&A event.7 The results from the two-stage-least-square 
(2SLS) estimation are consistent with the baseline results and confirm the adverse spillover 
effect of M&A  on the local non-tradable sector employment.  
To further confirm the effect of M&A Events on local employment growth, I use 
household level data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) to test 
the employment change at the individual level. The granular data at the household level 
enables me to control for individual characteristics and heterogeneity. I find results 
consistent with MSA-level findings. Individuals who work not only in the manufacturing 
sector but also in the non-tradable sector suffer from downsizing associated with M&A 
Events. An individual who worked in the manufacturing sector (non-tradable sector) before 
an M&A Event is found to be 2.4% (3.7%) more likely to become unemployed in the post-
M&A Event period.  
 
6 To mitigate the concern that local economic shocks may drive the aggregate industry valuation (e.g., a flood 
in Michigan may cause a valuation decrease for the auto industry), I “clean” the valuation measure by 
orthogonalizing it with respect to average local economic shocks. See section 4.2 for more details. 
7 A similar approach has been adopted by Bartik (1991), Blanchard et al. (1992), Autor et al. (2013), and 




To provide further evidence on the decline in local consumer demand and explore the 
potential channel, I test the effect of M&As on wage growth and workforce migration. An 
M&A Event is associated with reduced wage growth in both the manufacturing and non-
tradable sectors. Further tests on the effect of M&As on workforce migration show that 
M&A Events also correlate with lower population growth, lower labor force growth, and 
lower net migration inflow in the next three years. I use the total payroll growth in the non-
tradable sector as a proxy for sales growth because of the unavailability of a direct measure 
of sales growth in the non-tradable sector. Considering that the non-tradable sector is 
usually labor-intensive and very competitive, the total payroll should account for a 
relatively constant share of total sales, and hence, the total payroll growth should be in line 
with the sales growth.8 I find that M&A Events are negatively related to total payroll 
growth in the non-tradable sector, corroborating the theoretical prediction that the decrease 
in non-tradable sector employment is due to lower consumer demand for goods and 
services. Overall, the findings on wage and migration change provide additional support 
for the hypothesis that M&A in the manufacturing sector lead to lower employment growth 
in the local non-tradable sector.  
Next, I investigate whether the spillover effect of M&A Events varies across MSAs 
and different types of M&A deals. First, MSAs that rely more heavily on the manufacturing 
sector are more likely to experience a spillover effect on the non-tradable sector 
employment after an M&A Event. Second, compared to other mergers, horizontal mergers 
 
8 According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, the labor share (ratio of employee compensation and 
proprietors’ labor compensation to the total output) only declined by 3% from 1997 to 2014 in the retail trade 
industry. Meanwhile, the labor share in the nondurable goods sector declined by 15% during the same period. 




are associated with a stronger need for, as well as greater flexibility in, cost reduction and 
labor restructuring. Hence, M&A Events that consist of horizontal deals should have a 
more pronounced impact on the local non-tradable sector employment. Tests on sub-
samples and with M&A Events defined based on different types of deals confirm both 
conjectures.  
As M&As pose externalities on target firms’ local labor markets, do various labor 
protections have differential effects on the spillover? I investigate this by analyzing the role 
of minimum wage requirements on M&A spillovers. As non-tradable sector firms are more 
sensitive to the change in the minimum wage (Cengiz et al., 2019), the level of the 
minimum wage in the local state may affect firms’ ability to cope with adverse demand 
shocks. I find that while lower employment growth in the manufacturing sector is persistent 
in all states, the slowdown in the non-tradable sector employment growth only occurs in 
states with minimum wages higher than the federal level. Additional tests also indicate that 
non-tradable sector employers in areas with low minimum wage levels might handle 
downward pressure by reducing the wage levels. These results imply that a lower level of 
minimum wage could help firms in the non-tradable sector absorb negative demand shocks 
and mitigate the adverse outcomes of M&A Events on local consumer demand.  
This study is closely related to the growing literature on employment and merger 
decisions. The extant literature has focused on several aspects. First, the labor market 
provides motives for corporate M&As (Ouimet and Zarutskie, 2016; Tate and Yang, 2016). 
Second, M&As are associated with changes in post-merger employment levels, wages, and 
the composition of the workforce (Ma et al., 2016; Olsson and Tåg, 2017; Lagaras, 2018; 




synergies and value creation in corporate takeovers (John et al., 2015; Dessaint et al., 2017). 
This study contributes to the literature by demonstrating that the effect of M&As on 
employment is not restricted to the target facilities but spills over to other industries in the 
local area through reduced consumer demand.  
The study also adds to the literature on local consumer demand changes and the non-
tradable sector employment fluctuation. Moretti (2010) suggests that each new job created 
has a local multiplier. Mian et al. (2013) and Mian and Sufi (2014) illustrate that losses in 
housing net wealth are associated with a drop in household consumption and non-tradable 
sector employment. Giroud and Mueller (2017) and Giroud and Mueller (2019) explore the 
role of firms in employment growth in responses to declines in local consumer demand. 
This study contributes to the literature by identifying a decline in non-tradable sector 
employment caused by M&As in the manufacturing sector. The findings may also benefit 
the studies that focus on the decline in the U.S. manufacturing sector (e.g., Autor et al., 
2013; Autor and Dorn, 2013; Pierce and Schott, 2016) as they provide evidence on the 
underlying social cost of this decline.  
Lastly, the study builds a link between corporate events and the welfare of households. 
Shleifer and Summers (1988) suggest that hostile takeovers may boost shareholders’ gain 
at the cost of other stakeholders. Butler et al. (2017) and Cornaggia et al. (2018) study the 
spillover effect of initial public offerings and find contrary results. Bernstein et al. (2018) 
study the effect of different bankruptcy approaches on the local economy and find that 
liquidated establishments affect employment adversely. In contrast to these studies, this 
study sheds light on the spillover effect resulting from corporate restructuring and helps 




The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data and 
summary statistics. Section 3 presents the effect of M&A Events on the local employment 
growth in MSAs where target firms are headquartered. Section 4 provides further evidence 
on the local labor market spillover of M&A Events. Section 5 presents the results on the 
wage change, cross-sectional variation, and role of minimum wage requirements, and 
section 6 concludes. 
2. Data  
2.1. MSA-Level Data  
The MSA-level analysis uses the publicly available data from the U.S. Census QWI, 
which are derived from the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics program at the 
Census Bureau and provide employment and wage information based on detailed firm 
characteristics, such as geography, industry, age, and size. My main analysis focuses on 
MSA-level data instead of county-level data for two reasons. First, for reasons of 
confidentiality, the U.S. Census blocks out some of the variables from the publicly 
available QWI data. This missing variable issue is more severe at the county level than at 
the MSA level. Second, the local labor market is not constrained at the local counties; the 
workforce can migrate between counties while MSAs are larger areas and inter-MSA 
travels are less frequent. I focus on the employment growth in the manufacturing sector 
(two-digit NAICS code 31-33) and the non-tradable sector, which consists of Retail Trade 




code 72).9 (see, e.g., Mian and Sufi, 2014; Adelino et al., 2017; Bernstein et al., 2018) The 
data on population, and income per capita comes from the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
and is available at the MSA year level dating back to 1990. Finally, I obtain the data on the 
labor force and the unemployment rate from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. After merging 
all the data sources, my final sample contains 24,107 MSA-quarter observations from 345 
MSAs.  
2.2. M&A Data  
I obtain the data on M&As from Securities Data Company (SDC). From all the deals 
between 1990 and 2014 with target firms belonging to the manufacturing sector, I exclude 
leveraged buyouts, spinoffs, recapitalizations, self-tender offers, exchange offers, 
repurchases, partial equity purchases, acquisitions of remaining interest, and privatizations. 
I also require that both the acquirers and targets are in the United States as cross-border 
mergers may be driven by different purposes with domestic deals. Finally, the transaction 
value should be at least $45 million in 2010 dollars for a target to be included in the 
sample.10  
For each target, I obtain the target zip code from SDC to identify its location. If the zip 
code of the target is missing in SDC, I collect the address of the target’s headquarters from 
Compustat, whereever available. One concern with the empirical analysis is that the target 
zip code reported in the SDC data is usually the zip codes of the target’s headquarters. If a 
 
9 Mian and Sufi (2014) define the non-tradable sector at the four-digit North American industry classification 
service (NAICS) code level, but the QWI data provides the best coverage at the two-digit NAICS sectoral 
level. As argued by Adelino et al. (2017), the definition of the non-tradable sector as Retail Trade (two-digit 
NAICS code 44-45) and Accommodation and Food Services (two-digit NAICS code 72) provides the closest 
match with this definition. 




target firm operates in multiple geographic areas, the empirical analysis may overlook the 
employment effect in their subsidiary areas. To address this concern, I match the SDC data 
with the Publicly Listed National Establishment Time Series (NETS) data and check the 
geographic concentration of target’s employment. Using a matching method based on 
name, location, and industry, I successfully match 569 SDC deals with the NETS data.  
In Table A1, I report the employment concentration of the targets.11 On average, 58.2% 
of the target employments locate in the headquarters MSAs while the same ratio is only 
38.6% for the acquirers. About half of the target companies have at least 60% of their 
employees in the headquarters MSAs. In addition, about 72% of the target companies in 
the sample have the highest employment in their headquarters MSAs while the same ratio 
is only 60% for acquirers. Overall, a significant portion of target companies’ employment 
concentrates in the headquarters MSAs, confirming the validity of using location 
information from SDC. 
There are two empirical challenges in identifying the influential mergers in local MSAs. 
First, theoretically, a merger needs to be substantially large to have a major impact on the 
local labor market. Second, for some MSAs, there are more than one mergers in each 
quarter or in consecutive quarters, posing a challenge to identify the merger that had a real 
impact. To address such issues, I follow the previous studies on merger waves and identify 
significant jumps of M&A activities in each MSA. A similar approach has been adopted 
by previous studies, such as Harford (2005) and Bhattacharyya and Nain (2011). 
Specifically, for each MSA in the sample, I measure the quarterly M&A activities as the 
 




total transaction value of all deals announced in the quarter. Then I calculate the time series 
mean of transaction values in each MSA. I classify an MSA as having experienced an 
M&A Event in a given quarter when the combined transaction value in that quarter is at 
least two standard deviations higher than the time-series mean transaction value in the same 
MSA. This definition ensures that the M&A Events measured in the paper are significant 
consolidation in local areas. It also provides a clean pre-event period during which there 
was relatively little M&A activity. With such a definition, there are 282 M&A Events in 
my final sample.12 
2.3. Establishment-Level Data  
The establishment-level employment data are from the NETS Database. The NETS 
data provide time-series information on establishment locations, employments, estimated 
sales, business lines, economic performance (job and sales growth, DB Ratings, payment 
performance), and type of establishments (standalone, headquarters, or branch). I obtain 
the employment and sales information for establishments that were publicly listed between 
1990 and 2014 (which is the last year of the data available to me). I match the NETS data 
with SDC based on names, location, and industry of the headquarters establishments at the 
deal announcement year. I then remove establishments in Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto 
Rico. 13  Following Lagaras (2018) and Arnold (2019), I focus my analysis only on 
establishments with at least 50 employees during the year before deal announcements. To 
keep consistency with the main tests, I only keep the target establishments located in the 
 
12 Tests with alternative definitions of M&A Events find statistically and economically similar results. 
Results of the baseline regressions with alternative definitions of M&A Events are reported in table A5. 
13 The employment data in the NETS database has been validated and used by many of the existing studies 





headquarters MSAs. For each target establishment, I follow Li (2013), and construct a 
control group based on the following criteria: 1) the establishment operates in the same 
two-digit NAICS sector; 2) the establishment does not experience any M&A activities 
during [T-3, T+3] period of the merger; and 3) the establishment is in the same employment 
decile and sales decile as the target establishment. For each merged establishment, I select 
one control establishment with employment level closest to the target establishment before 
the year of the deal announcement. I then test the employment change three years before 
and three years after the merger. In Table A2, I provide the summary statistics of the 
establishment level data.  
2.4. Household-Level Data  
My sample of the household analysis is drawn from the 1995 and 2003 panels of the 
micro-level SIPP data because households’ MSA information is no longer available in the 
SIPP data after 2003. Each SIPP panel tracks 60,000 to 80,000 individuals over a period 
of up to four years. From the SIPP data, I obtain employment-related information regarding 
individuals’ employment status, occupation, industry, work experience, and income. 
Additionally, I obtain information on demographics, such as age, sex, race, marital status, 
household size, and educational attainment. I exclude individuals below the age of 16 or 
above the age of 70 as they are less likely to be active in the labor market. I also exclude 
individuals with missing geographic information. As a result, my final sample includes 
93,795 individuals. In Table A3, I report the summary statistics of the household level data. 




Table 1 reports the summary statistics. There are a total of 24,107 observations from 
345 MSAs.14 On average, about 4% of the MSA-quarter observations show at least one 
influential M&A Event in the sample. In an average MSA, about 16% of the total 
employees work in the manufacturing sector and about 24% work in the non-tradable sector. 
The average quarterly wage (in 2010 dollars) for workers in the manufacturing sector is 
$13,819.34, while it is only $6,803.44 for workers in the non-tradable sector.  
M&As in the manufacturing sector in the U.S. have been substantial, both in terms of 
absolute dollar value and the fraction of all merger deals. As Figure 1a shows, on average, 
about 20%-25% of the U.S. targets are from the manufacturing sector. Although the 
proportion of deals in the manufacturing sector has been decreasing since 2010, possibly 
because of an overall decline in the sector, the average transaction value is still higher than 
the merger deals in other sectors. Figure 1b presents the dollar value of all deals and the 
fraction of all deals with targets from the manufacturing sector. On average, deals in the 
manufacturing sector account for about 30% of all transaction value in the U.S. Both the 
absolute dollar amount and the fraction show a trend that fluctuates in the sample period. 
It drops in the early 1990s, and then increases from the late 1990s until it reaches the first 
peak at the beginning of the 21st century. It then drops to its lowest level in 2004 before 
climbing back up in 2005 and stays at the level till 2010. Both the dollar amount and the 
fraction of acquisitions in the manufacturing sector decreased in recent years and stayed at 
a relatively low level after 2010.  
 
14 Different states started reporting to the QWI at different time. For example, Massachusetts did not start 




Figure 2 presents the geographic distribution of M&As in the manufacturing sector. 
Figure 2a shows the number of deals in each county from 1990 to 2014, while Figure 2b 
shows the total transaction value (in 2010 dollars) in each county during the same period. 
The acquisitions in the manufacturing sector show concentration in certain geographical 
areas. For example, most of the deals are concentrated in the northeast as well as on the 
west coast, most likely because of the geographic concentration of industries. 
3. Effect of M&As on Employment Growth  
3.1. Target Establishment Level Analysis  
Although a general decline in the target employment level has been well documented 
by previous studies (Li, 2013; Lagaras, 2018; Arnold, 2019), in this section, I formally 
present a test to show the change in employment at the target firms using establishment 
level from NETS data. Especially, I focus on target establishments in the headquarters 
MSA. For each target establishment, I select a control establishment by matching on the 
two-digit NAICS, employment decile, and sales decile at the year before the deal 
announcement. If multiple control establishments are found, I choose the establishment 
with the closest employment level. The identifying assumption for this test is that the target 
and control establishments should follow similar trends in employment change in the 
absence of the merger.  
Following previous studies, I estimate the following matched difference-in-differences 
design:15  
 
15 Existing studies such as Li (2013), Ma et al. (2016), Lagaras (2018) and Arnold (2019). use similar 




𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐸𝑚𝑝)𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑖 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜔𝑡 +
𝜀𝑖,𝑡,                                                                                         (1) 
where 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐸𝑚𝑝)𝑖,𝑡  is the log employment of establishment i at time t. 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡  is the 
indicator for the periods after the M&A deal completion. 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑖  is an indicator that 
equals one if the establishment is a target of an M&A deal and locates in the headquarters 
MSA. The interaction term 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑖 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 captures the average treatment effect of the 
M&A deals. 𝑋𝑖,𝑡  is a vector that contains characteristics of the establishment and the 
establishment’s MSA. 16  𝜃𝑖  measures the year fixed effects and 𝜔𝑡  measures the 
establishment fixed effects. 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the error term. 𝛽3 is the main coefficient of interest. A 
negative and statistically significant 𝛽3 implies that M&As have a negative impact on the 
employment level at the target establishments. Standard errors are clustered at the 
establishment level.  
Table 2 reports the regression results. In columns (1) to (3) of Table 2, the dependent 
variable is the log(employment) at the establishment. In column (1), the coefficient of 
Target × Post is negative and statistically significant. It indicates that compared to the 
control establishments, the target establishments on average experienced a greater decline 
in employment level. The coefficient of -0.097 indicates that compared to the control 
establishments, the target establishments on average experience a 9.7% decrease in 
employment after the merger. In column (2) of table 2, I include firm level control variables 
such as log (Establishment Age) and log (Number of branches). The coefficient of Target 
× Post remains negative and statistically significant. The target establishments on average 
 
16 The control variables include log (age of the establishment), log (number of total branches of the company), 




experience a 15.5% decline in employment level relative to the control establishments. In 
column (3), I further control for population, average income, and the unemployment rate 
of the establishments’ MSA to address the potential influence of local economic conditions 
on the employment change at the establishments. The estimated results remain statistically 
and economically unchanged. Overall, the results indicate a general decline in the 
employment level at the target establishments in the headquarters MSA after the 
completion of the mergers. The finding is consistent with previous studies (Li,2012; 
Li,2013; Lagaras, 2018; and Arnold, 2019). The finding that M&As are associated with a 
decline in the employment level provides support for my hypothesis and tests in the 
following sections.  
3.2. MSA Level Analysis  
My analysis of the local spillover effect of M&A Events is based on the comparison 
between MSAs that experienced M&As Events at different times. In the baseline analysis, 
I estimate the following MSA-quarter level panel regression:  
𝐸𝑚𝑝 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑚,𝑡,𝑡+12 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑀&𝐴 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑚,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑚,𝑡 + 𝜂𝑚 + 𝜋𝑡 + ε𝑚,𝑡,   (2) 
where 𝐸𝑚𝑝 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑚,𝑡,𝑡+12 measures the annualized three-year employment growth rate 
of MSA m. I focus on the three-year employment growth rate because it takes time to 
restructure the labor force after an M&A Event (Maksimovic et al, 2011). Specifically, to 
calculate the employment growth rate, I compare the employment of a sector at quarter t 
(EMPt) with the employment level of the same sector at quarter t+12 (𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑡+12). The 
employment growth rate is defined as (𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑡+12 −  𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑡)/𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑡.  𝑀&𝐴 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑚,𝑡 is an 




the past four quarters.17  𝑋𝑚,𝑡 denotes a vector of time-varying demographic characteristics 
including the MSA level population growth rate and the total income growth rate. In the 
main model specifications, I also control for the indicator whether the local MSA has a 
higher presence of the manufacturing sector than the national median. The rationale is that 
MSAs with varying degrees of dependency on the manufacturing sector might be affected 
differently by M&As in the manufacturing sector. I include MSA and year-quarter fixed 
effects, which are denoted by 𝜂𝑚  and 𝜋𝑡 , respectively, to control time-invariant 
heterogeneity and time trends.  
3.2.1. Effect on Employment growth in the Manufacturing Sector  
Table 3 reports the results of the baseline regressions. The dependent variable is the 
annualized three-year employment growth rate (× 100) in the manufacturing sector. In 
column (1), I control for the MSA and year-quarter fixed effects. The coefficient -0.255 
indicates that, compared with the MSAs not experiencing an M&A Event in the past four 
quarters, MSAs with M&A Events are associate with a 25.5-basis-point lower annual 
employment growth rate in the next three years. This result is economically significant 
compared to the unconditional mean of -1.119%. In column (2), I control for MSA 
characteristics by including the population growth rate and the personal income growth 
rate in the regression. The coefficient of the M&A Event indicator remains negative and 
statistically significant. The coefficient decreases from 0.255 to 0.240 compared to column 
(1), but the magnitude remains economically large.  
 




In column (3), I control for whether the MSA relies heavily on the manufacturing sector 
to address the possibility that the M&A Event variable could, in part, be picking up an 
overall declining trend in the U.S. manufacturing sector rather than being caused by an 
M&A Event. The high manufacturing area indicator is equal to one if the share of the 
manufacturing sector employment in the MSA is higher than the national median. The 
estimated coefficient indicates that an MSA with high presence of the manufacturing sector 
is on average associated with a 1.78 percentage points lower employment growth rate in 
the next three years. Finally, in column (4), I introduce the state × quarter fixed effects to 
address the possibility of heterogeneous trends across states. Some states might experience 
specific transitions in industry composition. For example, the manufacturing sector in 
Michigan might be going through a decline while the manufacturing sector in Tennessee 
is experiencing an expansion. Therefore, controlling for the state × quarter fixed effects 
can effectively address the possible bias caused by state level time varying heterogeneity. 
The coefficient on the M&A Event dummy remains statistically significant at -0.335, 
indicating that MSAs with M&A Events in the past four quarters are associated with a 
33.5-basis-point lower annualized three-year employment growth in the manufacturing 
sector.  
Taken together, the results from columns (1) to (4) suggest that a significant jump in 
M&A activities is associated with a sector-wide employment slowdown in the MSA where 
the targets are located. Lagaras (2018) finds that M&As are associated with a significant 
decline in the employment in the target firms through increased layoffs. My findings show 





3.2.2. Effect on Employment Growth in the Non-Tradable Sector  
The previous section has established the relation between M&A Events and the decline 
in the employment growth rate in the manufacturing sector. In this section, I examine the 
spillover of the negative effect on employment growth to the non-tradable sector. As 
illustrated by Mian and Sufi (2014), the non-tradable sector, such as retail and restaurants, 
depends heavily on the local demand. Consequently, layoffs after M&As are expected to 
lower the average wages and consumer demand of the local community. I follow Mian and 
Sufi (2014) and Adelino et al. (2017) to define the non-tradable sector as consisting of 
Retail Trade (two-digit NAICS 44-45) and Accommodation and Food Services (two-digit 
NAICS 72). I replace the dependent variable in the baseline regressions with the annualized 
three-year employment growth rate in the non-tradable sector and repeat the regressions 
specified in equation (1). Table 4 reports the results.  
In Table 4, columns (1) to (4) repeat the tests matching the same columns reported in 
Table 3. In column (1), the model with no control variables indicates that an MSA with an 
M&A Event in the past four quarters is associated with a 0.103% lower annual employment 
growth rate in the non-tradable sector for the next three years. Further, in columns (2) and 
(3), where I control for MSA characteristics, the economic magnitude of the coefficient on 
the M&A Event stays similar. The coefficients on M&A Event dummy is economically 
significant compared to the unconditional sample mean of 1.171%. Finally, I repeat the 
same process as in Table 3 and control for state × time fixed effects. The coefficient on the 
M&A Event is 10.9 basis points, indicating that an M&A Event correlates to a 10.9-basis-
point lower annual employment growth in the non-tradable sector. I adopt column (4) in 




Overall, the results in Table 4 indicate that there is a “hidden” cost of M&As that is 
borne by the local community where the targets are located.18 By laying off redundant 
workforce and improving corporate efficiency, M&As are associated with a slower 
employment growth in the local area, not only for the manufacturing sector where the 
targets belong, but also for other sectors, such as the non-tradable sector.  
4. Robustness Analysis  
4.1. Placebo Event Dates and Alternative Definitions of Events  
Table 4 shows that M&As are associated with slower employment growth in the non-
tradable sector. In this section, I first employ a placebo test to address the concern that the 
above results might be driven by other confounding factors. Specifically, I change the 
timing of the M&A Events by replacing the event dates with placebo event dates that are 
12 quarters before the actual dates. If acquirers pick up targets from areas with deteriorating 
conditions in the manufacturing sector or the local economy, then it is the deteriorating 
economic condition, rather than the M&A Events, that causes the findings reported in the 
previous sections. In this case, the placebo M&A Event dates should have a similarly 
negative impact on employment growth. Column (1) of Table 5 reports the result of the 
test with the placebo event dates. The dependent variable is the annualized three-year 
employment growth rate in the non-tradable sector. The coefficient on the M&A Event 
dummy is neither statistically nor economically significant, indicating that it is not the 
long-term trend in the local economy that drives the results reported in the previous 
 
18 In appendix table A4, I also test the effect of M&A Events on the overall employment growth rate of the 




sections. Rather, it is the M&A Events that may cause slower employment growth in the 
MSAs.  
Second, I address the potential effect of the overlapping M&A Events. Specifically, if 
one MSA experiences multiple significant jumps in M&A activities within three years, the 
estimated employment change after the first M&A Event might be contaminated by the 
following events. This might cause a bias in the estimated results. To address this concern, 
I “clean” the events by only keeping the first M&A Event in an MSA if there are multiple 
M&A Events within a three-year window. I then repeat the regression with the cleaned 
M&A Event dummy in column (2) of Table 5. As can be seen, the coefficient on the M&A 
Event dummy is consistent with the baseline regression.  
Third, as Figure 1 shows, a large fraction of the M&As in the manufacturing sector 
took place around the Financial Crisis. The crisis could also affect local consumer demand 
by lowering household net wealth (Mian et al., 2013). To address this concern, I exclude 
the employment growth data after 2007 and repeat the baseline regression. The results on 
the non-tradable sector employment growth are similar to the baseline results. Finally, the 
competition from China has caused a decline of the employment in the manufacturing 
sector (e.g., Autor et al., 2013; Pierce and Schott, 2016). The pressure may also lead to 
lower employment growth in the local non-tradable sector. Therefore, I follow Autor et al. 
(2013) and estimate the local areas’ exposure to the Chinese import penetration.19 I repeat 
 
19 I first obtain the data of the industry-level trade flows from China to the U.S. between 1991 and 2007. The 
data is available on David Dorn’s website (https://www.ddorn.net/data.htm). I then follow Autor et al. (2013) 
to interact the industry level import flow with the MSA’s share of employment in each industry in 1990. I 
aggregate the interacted value for each MSA and use it to measure an MSA’s exposure to the import 
competition from China. Finally, I scale the MSA’s exposure to import competition by U.S. real GDP. Note 
that the import flow data is only available from 1991 to 2007 so the test in column (4) of Table 5 is from 




baseline tests while controlling for the effect of local exposure to the Chinese import. The 
effect of M&A Events in column (4) remains similar to the baseline regression. Overall, 
tests in Table 5 confirm the findings from the baseline tests that M&As in manufacturing 
sector have a negative spillover effect on the local labor market in areas where the target 
firms are located.  
The empirical tests in Table 3 and Table 4 are based on the definition of M&A Events, 
which is an indicator equal to one when the combined transaction value in a quarter is at 
least two standard deviations higher than the mean transaction value in the local MSA. In 
Table A5, I test the robustness of results reported in Table 3 and Table 4 by using 
alternative definitions of M&A Events. First, I change the definition of M&A Events to an 
indicator that equals one when the combined transaction value in a quarter is one standard 
deviation or three standard deviations higher than the mean transaction value in the local 
MSA. Second, I define the M&A Events based on the largest deal in terms of transaction 
value.  Third, I construct a continuous measure and replace M&A Event dummy with the 
log of combined transaction value in the MSA during the last four quarters. The results in 
Table A5 are both statistically and economically consistent with baseline results when 
M&A Events are measured with alternative definitions.20  
4.2. 2SLS Analysis  
The previous sections reveal that M&A Events in the manufacturing sector are 
correlated with a negative spillover effect on non-tradable sector employment by lowering 
local consumer demand. However, the correlation can hardly be interpreted as causal 
 
20 I also repeat the test by replacing the dependent variable with the annualized five-year employment growth 




because unobserved economic factors could drive both employment growth in the non-
tradable sector and an M&A Event at the same time. To provide more evidence on the 
relation between M&A Events and local labor market spillovers, I construct a measure to 
capture the exogenous variation in the probability of an MSA experiencing an M&A Event.  
The literature connecting stock market valuation with corporate takeovers finds that 
undervalued firms are more likely to be selected as targets in takeovers (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 2003; Edmans et al., 2012). Similarly, if more firms from the same industry are 
undervalued, the industry should be more likely to become a target industry (Rhodes-Kropf 
and Viswanathan, 2004; Rhodes-Kropf et al., 2005). Hence, if an undervalued industry 
accounts for a large fraction of the local employment, the area might be more appealing for 
potential acquirers and be more likely to experience an M&A Event. Overall, this 
identification strategy hinges on the notion that MSAs with various exposure to 
undervalued industries might have different ex-ante probabilities to experience M&A 
Events.  




𝑖  𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡,                                            (3)             
where 𝑆𝑚,𝑡  measures the valuation shock to MSA m at time t. 𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑖,𝑚  measures the 
employment of four-digit NAICS manufacturing industry i of MSA m when the MSA first 
enters the sample. 𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑚 measures the total employment of MSA m when the MSA first 
enters the sample. I measure the local presence of an industry using the first available 
observation of an MSA to mitigate the concern of potential feedback effect from local labor 




valuation measure. 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 measures by how much the firms from industry i are traded 
to their maximum potential value absent managerial inefficiency and mispricing.21 The 
identifying assumption in equation (3) is that while the probability of having a merger 
target is likely to be endogenously related to local economic conditions, an industry’s 
valuation is more likely to be driven by aggregate economic shocks. Areas with various 
ex-ante exposure to each industry would have different sensitivities to the fluctuations in 
industry valuation. However, the local valuation measure 𝑆𝑚,𝑡 is also subject to potential 
bias. If an industry is concentrated in one area, the idiosyncratic shock to that area (e.g., 
housing market crash, natural disasters) could also affect industry valuation. For example, 
a flood in Michigan might impact the performance and outlook of the whole auto industry 
and lead to a decrease in valuation in the auto manufacturing industry.  
To address this issue, I calculate the weighted average discount (weighted by market 
value) for all firms in the same MSA, 𝑆𝑚,𝑡
𝐿 . Then, I regress the original measure 𝑆𝑚,𝑡 on 
𝑆𝑚,𝑡
𝐿  and take the residual term ?̃?𝑚,𝑡. If 𝑆𝑚,𝑡
𝐿  captures the common valuation shocks shared 
by all firms in the local area, ?̃?𝑚,𝑡 will be orthogonal to the local economic conditions and 
capture the exogenous variation in the probability of an M&A Event in the MSA. I then 
estimate the following regression  
𝑀&𝐴 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑚,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 × ?̃?𝑚,𝑡−1 + 𝛼2 × 𝑋𝑚,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑚,𝑡,                   (4) 
 
21 Specifically, I follow Edmans et al. (2012) to construct the discount measure based on Tobin’s Q. The 
successful firms in an industry are defined as firms that rank on the 80th percentile in their four-digit NAICS 
industry. I calculate the discount measure as (Q∗ − Q)/Q∗. See Edmans et al. (2012) for more details. I then 




where 𝑋𝑚,𝑡 is a vector of the characteristics of MSA m at time t. 𝛼1 is expected to be 
negative if areas with industries that have higher valuation are less likely to experience 
an M&A Event. In the second stage, I estimate the following regression 
𝐸𝑚𝑝 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑚,𝑡,𝑡+12 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 × 𝑀&𝐴 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑚,𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ + 𝛽2 × 𝑋𝑚,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑚,𝑡,           (5)  
where 𝐸𝑚𝑝 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑚,𝑡,𝑡+12 is the same as in equation (2) and measures the annualized 
three-year employment growth rate. 𝑀&𝐴 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑚,𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ denotes the predicted probability of 
an M&A Event in the local MSA. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 6 report the results of first 
stage regressions. The local discount variable is negative and statistically significant on the 
probability of the MSA experiencing an M&A Event. A one SD increase in the local 
discount variable is associated with a 1.7% lower probability of an M&A Event. This effect 
is economically significant as well, given that the unconditional mean of the M&A Event 
is only about 4%. The local discount variable has a strong explanatory power with partial 
F-statistics of 22.61 and 22.91 in columns (1) and (2), respectively. In columns (3) and (4), 
I test the effect of M&A Events on manufacturing sector employment growth. The reduced 
form regression in column (3) indicates that a one SD increase in the local discount variable 
is associated with a 50-basis-point increase in the manufacturing sector employment. 
Additionally, column (4) suggests that a one SD increase in the local discount variable is 
associated with a 70-basis-point higher growth rate in the employment of the non-tradable 
sector.  
In the last four columns of Table 6, I report the coefficient estimates for the second-
stage regressions. All coefficients in columns (5) to (7) show negative and significant effect 




sectors, consistent with the ordinary least squares (OLS) results. Including or removing the 
control variables do not affect the point estimates significantly. However, it is important to 
notice that the point estimates of the 2SLS regressions are much higher than the point 
estimates in the OLS regression. The greater 2SLS estimates indicate that M&A Events 
driven by differences in valuation lead to a greater drop in employment growth than 
average M&A Events. This is possible as the acquiring firms could identify undervalued 
targets and realize the potential value gain through labor restructuring. Alternatively, the 
2SLS estimates could capture the marginal effect of a large valuation change. Acquiring 
firms might only approach a target when the target is significantly undervalued. I use the 
OLS model as the preferred model because it shows the average effect of M&A Events and 
is more conservative.  
4.3. Household Level Analysis  
The previous sections have established the relation between M&A Events and the 
spillover effect at the MSA level. In this section, I analyze how M&A Events affect the 
local labor market using household-year panel data from SIPP. My purpose is to provide 
evidence at the micro level to corroborate the findings at the aggregate MSA level. 
Specifically, I estimate the following regression:  
𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑚,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑀𝑓𝑔(𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒)𝑖  ×  𝑀&𝐴 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑚,𝑡,𝑡−3 +
𝛼2𝑀&𝐴 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑚,𝑡,𝑡−3 + 𝛼3𝑋𝑚,𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑌𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜂𝑚 + 𝜔𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,                                                           
(6)  
where 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑚,𝑡 is an indicator of the employment outcome of individual i from MSA 




was working in the manufacturing sector (the non-tradable sector) at the first appearance 
in the sample. 𝑀&𝐴 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑚,𝑡,𝑡−3 is an indicator equal to one if MSA m experienced an 
M&A Event at time (t-3, t). 𝑋𝑚,𝑡 is a vector of the characteristics of MSA m at time t and 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 is a vector of individual characteristics of individual i. 𝜂𝑚 represents the time invariant 
MSA fixed effects. 𝜔𝑡 represents the year fixed effects and 𝜃𝑖  represents the individual 
fixed effects. To study the effect of M&A Events on the household, I focus on two 
outcomes. First, the probability that an individual stays in the manufacturing sector (the 
non-tradable sector) and second, the probability that the individual loses his job after the 
M&A Events.  
Table A2 reports the summary statistics of the household-level data. The individuals in 
the sample have an average age of 40. About 53% of the individuals are married. 10% of 
the sample observations work in the manufacturing sector and about 12% work in the non-
tradable sector.22 Overall, about 73% of the individuals in the sample are employed during 
the sample period. Table 7 reports the estimated results.23 
In Panel A of Table 7, I test the effect of M&A Events on individuals working in the 
manufacturing sector. The 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑀𝑓𝑔𝑖  dummy is defined as one if the individual i was 
working in the manufacturing sector during the year of her first appearance in the sample. 
In columns (1) to (3), the dependent variable is an indicator whether individual i works in 
the manufacturing sector. In column (1), I do not include any control variables; in column 
 
22 The relative size of employment in the non-tradable and manufacturing sectors in the QWI data between 
1995 and 2003 is similar to that of the SIPP data. 
23 In Table 7, I also control the cohort fixed effects of each household. This is to control for the heterogeneity 




(2), I control for all individual characteristics and MSA characteristics;24 and in column (3), 
I control for MSA × year fixed effects to address the potential issue that different MSAs 
could have different trends in the local labor market. The coefficient on the interaction term 
Initial Mfg × M&A Event is negative and statistically significant, indicating that an 
individual working in the manufacturing sector before the M&A Events is less likely to 
keep working in the manufacturing sector. The estimated coefficient is equal to -0.069 to -
0.067 across three model specifications, indicating that after the M&A Events, a treated 
individual is 6.9% to 6.7% less likely to remain in the manufacturing sector. In columns 
(4) to (6), I test the probability of an individual being employed after the M&A Events. 
The coefficient estimates in columns (4) to (6) indicate that individuals who worked in the 
manufacturing sector before the completion of mergers are 1.9% to 2.4% more likely to 
become unemployed during the three-year period after the M&A Events.  
Further, I test the effect of M&A Events on workers in the non-tradable sector. The 
Initial Non-tradable dummy in Panel B of Table 7 is defined as one if an individual was 
working in the non-tradable sector during the year of first appearance in the sample. Like 
the results of Panel A, the coefficient on Initial Non-tradable × M&A Event is negative 
and statistically significant in all specifications, indicating that individuals who worked in 
the non-tradable sector are more likely to leave the sector after M&A Events. The effect is 
also economically significant. In columns (1) to (3) of Panel B, a treated individual is about 
9.8% less likely to work in the non-tradable sector after an M&A Event.  
 
24 The control variables include MSA population, average income, unemployment rate, household size, age, 




Further, as columns (4) to (6) indicate, an individual working in the non-tradable sector 
is 4.4% more likely to become unemployed after M&A Events. Overall, the results from 
Table 7 confirm the findings that M&As in the manufacturing sector not only lead to a 
reduction in employment in the manufacturing sector, but also lead to a negative spillover 
on employment in the non-tradable sector.  
5.  Wage, Migration and Cross-sectional Variation  
5.1. Effect of M&A Events on Wages and Labor Migration 
The previous sections have documented a negative spillover effect on employment 
growth from the manufacturing sector to the local non-tradable sector after significant 
M&A Events. In this section, I explore the potential channels of the effect by testing the 
wage change and migrations. Existing works such as Moretti (2010), Mian and Sufi (2014), 
Adelino et al. (2017) and Bernstein et al. (2018) suggest that firms in the non-tradable 
sector, such as retailers and restaurants, depends heavily on the local demand. As shown in 
the theoretical model in the Appendix, the change in employment in the manufacturing 
sector diffuses to the non-tradable sector through fluctuations in total labor income. If 
M&As have a negative effect on employment in the manufacturing sector, the decreasing 
total labor income in the manufacturing sector then reduces the local consumer demand for 
products in the non-tradable sector. This will lead to lower employment growth in the local 
non-tradable sector.  
Due to the data limitation, I cannot directly examine the change of sales growth in the 
local non-tradable sector businesses in the current version of the paper. Therefore, in this 




M&A Events. First, I analyze the effect of M&A Events on the MSA’s wage growth in 
Panel A of Table 8. In column (1), I study the change in wage growth in the manufacturing 
sector. The dependent variable is the annualized three-year quarterly wage growth in the 
manufacturing sector. An M&A Event is negatively correlated with the three-year wage 
growth rate with a coefficient of -0.203. The coefficient indicates that MSAs with an M&A 
Event are expected to experience a 20.3-basis-point lower annual growth in wage in the 
manufacturing sector. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that M&As are 
associated with a higher probability of layoffs, which reduces labor demand and lead to 
lower wages.  
Next, I shift my focus to the wage growth in the non-tradable sector. Column (2) shows 
that M&A Events are associated with a 16.2-basis-point lower annual wage growth in the 
non-tradable sector. This finding is inconsistent with that of Mian and Sufi (2014), who 
find little evidence on wage change in the non-tradable sector after financial crisis, 
potentially due to differences in sample period and nature of the events. In column (3) of 
Panel A in Table 8, I use the non-tradable sector total payroll growth as a proxy of the sales 
growth in the local non-tradable sector. The underlying assumption is that the payroll for 
employees accounts for a relatively constant fraction of the total sales in the non-tradable 
sector. In column (3), the M&A Events are associated with a 23.8-basis-point lower total 
payroll growth in the non-tradable sector, indicating that the total sales growth is also lower 
in the local non-tradable sector following M&A Events.  
In Panel B of Table 8, I explore the effect of M&A Events on the migration of 




mobility response after M&A Events.25 Column (1) correlates the MSA level population 
growth rate with the M&A Events. There is weak evidence that the M&A Events are 
associated with a decline in the MSA population growth. The coefficient on the M&A 
Event dummy is negative but only statistically significant at the 10% level. In columns (2) 
and (3), I test the employment mobility using two alternative measures. In column (2), the 
annualized three-year labor force growth rate negatively correlates with M&A Events. 
Finally, in column (3), I use IRS tax return data and test the effect of M&A activities on 
net migration inflow. The net migration inflow is measured as number of the net in-
migration per 100 people in next three years. Column (3) indicates that M&A Events are 
associated with 0.238 fewer in-migration per 100 people in next three years. When 
combined, the results from Panel B of Table 8 further confirm a decline in local consumer 
demand after M&A Events.  
5.2. Cross-sectional Variation  
5.2.1. MSA Heterogeneity  
In this section, I test whether MSAs with different degrees of dependence on the 
manufacturing sector are affected deferentially by M&As. Presumably, MSAs with a 
greater presence of the manufacturing sector and a lower presence of the non-tradable 
sector should experience a stronger spillover effect. For this purpose, I construct the 
following measure as a proxy for the magnitude of the dependence on the manufacturing 
sector:  
 
25 Since the data on population is only available on an annual basis, the tests in Panel B of table 8 are 







,                                          (7)  
where 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑚,𝑡 is the employment in the manufacturing sector of MSA m 
at time t, and 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑚,𝑡 is the employment in the non-tradable sector of MSA 
m at time t. A higher ratio represents a greater dependence of the non-tradable sector on 
the manufacturing sector. To mitigate the effect of labor market dynamics on the evolution 
of the relative size of the manufacturing sector and the non-tradable sector, I calculate the 
time-series mean of the measure for each MSA and then split the sample based on the 
median value of each MSA’s average dependence.26  
Table 9 reports the regression results estimated with the subsamples of high and low 
dependence. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 9 report the results when the local dependence 
on manufacturing sector is high. The M&A Event dummy is negative and statistically 
significant on both employment growth and wage growth. An MSA with high dependence 
is expected to experience a 19.9-basis-point lower annual growth in employment and a 
24.9-basis-point lower annual growth in wage when experiencing an M&A Event. 
However, when I repeat the tests on the sample of MSAs with low dependence on the 
manufacturing sector, the coefficient on the M&A Event dummy is statistically 
insignificant, as shown in columns (3) and (4). Overall, results in Table 9 indicate that the 
local labor market spillover is stronger when local on-tradable sector employment depends 
more heavily on the manufacturing sector.  
5.2.2. Deal Heterogeneity  
 
26  I repeat the tests on subsamples based on cross-sectional median dependence. The results remain 




My analysis so far assumes that all types of mergers have a similar effect on the local 
employment. In this section, I test the heterogeneous effect of various types of mergers. 
For example, horizontal mergers are more likely to be motivated by potential synergy gain 
through cost savings, such as workforce reduction, than other types of mergers. In that case, 
target firms of horizontal mergers are expected to experience a greater post-merger 
employment loss. Consequently, the local area should experience a stronger drop in 
consumer demand, which can lead to a slower employment growth in the non-tradable 
sector. Meanwhile, as previous studies, such as Tate and Yang (2016) and Lagaras (2018) 
show, diversifying mergers are usually associated a lower probability of employment 
reduction. Consequently, the MSAs where the target firms of non-horizontal mergers are 
located should be less affected after M&A Events.  
In Table 10, I test the local spillover effect of M&A Events that consist of different 
types of takeovers. Specifically, I first calculate the percentage of horizontal deals in each 
M&A Event in terms of value of transaction.27 The result indicates that there is a stronger 
decrease in non-tradable sector employment if an M&A Event consists of a higher 
proportion of horizontal deals. In addition, the M&A Event dummy is statistically 
insignificant, indicating that the lower employment growth rate is almost completely driven 
by horizontal deals. The result in column (3) is consistent with result in column (1), 
indicating that M&A Events consist of more than 50% of horizontal deals are on average 
associated with a 25-basis-point lower annual employment growth in the non-tradable 
sector. However, despite a significant difference between the employment growth after 
horizontal and non-horizontal M&A Events, there is no statistically significant difference 
 




in wage growth for M&A Events with different fraction of horizontal deals. In columns (2) 
and (4), the M&A Event dummy is negative and statistically significant while the 
interaction terms are neither statistically nor economically significant. A possible 
explanation is that there is a downward pressure on the local consumer demand brought by 
all M&A Events. However, as the horizontal M&A Events have a stronger effect on the 
local consumer demand, they may drive the employers to lay off employees in addition to 
cutting their wages. Therefore, although there is no significant difference in terms of the 
wage growth decline between horizontal and non-horizontal M&A Events, there is a 
significantly stronger decline in the employment growth in the non-tradable sector after 
horizontal M&A Events.  
Overall, the results in table 10 indicate that when there is a greater room for cost 
reduction and labor restructuring, the post-merger employment reduction will be stronger 
and there will be a stronger negative spillover to the local non-tradable sector.  
5. 3. Minimum Wage Requirements and the Spillover Effect 
In this section, I explore whether state level labor protection can pose a heterogeneous 
effect on M&A-induced spillovers in the local labor market. Specifically, I focus on the 
role of minimum wage requirements, which might affect the spillover effect to the non-
tradable sector through a direct channel. Previous studies (e.g., Gustafson and Kotter, 2018; 
Cengiz et al., 2019) find that the non-tradable sector employs more minimum wage 
employees and firms in the non-tradable sector are, therefore, more sensitive to the changes 
in minimum wage requirements.28 In that case, the spillover effect on the non-tradable 
 
28 For example, Cengiz et al. (2019) point out that “The minimum wage is more binding in the non-tradable 




sector employment might be different due to the varying minimum wage requirements in 
different states. I split the sample into two subsamples based on whether the state minimum 
wage is above or below the federal minimum wage level and repeat the baseline tests in 
each subsample.  
Table 11 reports the estimated results. In columns (1) and (2), I test the effect of M&A 
Events on the MSAs’ manufacturing sector employment growth in states with minimum 
wages above/below the federal level. The results in columns (1) and (2) are statistically 
and economically similar to each other, indicating that the effect of M&As on employment 
in the manufacturing sector is not sensitive to minimum wage requirements, A possible 
explanation is that firms in the manufacturing sector usually pay wages higher than the 
legal minimum wage. In columns (3) and (4), I test the effect of M&A Events on the non-
tradable sector employment growth. The M&A Event dummy is only negative and 
statistically significant when the states’ minimum wages are higher than the federal level.  
Combined with the results from the previous sections, the results in Table 11 indicate 
that while mergers in the manufacturing sector might have a negative effect on the non-
tradable sector employment growth through deteriorated consumer demand, lower 
minimum wage requirements could mitigate the severity of the negative spillover in the 
non-tradable sector. Finally, tests in columns (5) and (6) of Table 11 further confirm this 
conjecture. Column (5) shows that M&A Events do not correlate with the average wage 
growth rate in MSAs with minimum wage higher than the federal level while column (6) 
indicates that non-tradable sector firms in MSAs with lower minimum wage might be able 
to avoid cutting employments by lowering wages. The finding is consistent with Chava et 




of small businesses in the affected states. It indicates that a lower level of minimum wage 
may help to absorb the negative demand pressure on the local non-tradable sector 
businesses. 
6. Conclusion  
In this paper, I examine the spillover effects of M&As on the local labor market. By 
focusing on M&As in the manufacturing sector, I find that areas with a significant jump in 
M&A activities are associated with lower employment growth not only in the 
manufacturing sector but also in the non-tradable sector. The spillover is likely to be driven 
by decreased local consumer demand. Areas with higher dependence on the manufacturing 
sector and areas with targets involved in horizontal mergers receive a more substantial 
spillover effect. Finally, lower minimum wage requirements help to ease the downward 
pressure on employment in the non-tradable sector after the M&A Events.  
This study highlights a previously overlooked externality of M&As. From a corporate 
efficiency perspective, takeovers are often regarded as effective methods for cost reduction 
and wealth creation; however, the improvement in private profits could be accompanied 
by a cost on other stakeholders (Shleifer and Summers, 1988). In this paper, I find that 
M&As have an unexpected externality on the local communities. While authorities, such 
as the Federal Trade Commission and the Department and Justice, mostly consider the 
potential effects of M&As on consumer welfare, the potential influence on local 
communities also deserves attention.  
Although this study sheds some light on the differential effect of M&As on local 




research to provide a thorough investigation of the labor policy implications. It would also 
be beneficial for future research to explore changes in local household behaviors resulting 
from corporate takeovers.   
Finally, the study also leaves an open question about the effect of M&As on the 
employment of acquiring companies. This study, along with other existing research (e.g., 
Maksimovic et al., 2011; Li, 2013; Tate and Yang, 2016; Lagaras, 2018; Arnold, 2019), is 
based on the assumption that M&As represent shocks to employment at the target 
companies. However, it is still not clear whether acquirers would experience similar 
employment reductions after M&As. Future research would be helpful to provide a 
complete picture of the effects of M&As on employment at acquirers, targets, and the 
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Figure 1. M&As in Manufacturing Sector 


























Figure 1 presents the number (ratio) (Figure 1a) and the value (ratio) (Figure 1b) of merger and 
acquisition deals in the manufacturing sector between 1990 to 2014. The bars represent the total 
number (value) of transactions each year and the solid line represents the fraction of deals in the 







Figure 2. M&As in Manufacturing Sector: Geographic Distribution 
 
(a) Number of Deals 
 
(b) Value of Deals 
 
Figure 2 presents the geographic distribution of all acquisitions with targets in the manufacturing 
sector. Figure 2a reports the quintiles of total number of deals in each county from 1990 to 2014. 
Figure 2b reports the quintiles of total deal value (million dollars) in each county. All values are in 





Table 1 Summary Statistics 
The table presents the summary statistics. The MSA-quarterly data is from the U.S. Census 
Quarterly Workforce Indicators (QWI) from 1990 to 2016. The manufacturing sector is defined as 
industries with two-digit NAICS code 31-33. The non-tradable sector is defined as industries with 
two-digit NAICS code 44-45 and 72. An M&A event is defined when the combined transaction 
value in a quarter in an MSA is at least two standard deviations higher than the time-series mean 
transaction value in the same MSA. All wages, incomes and market values are in 2010 dollars. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 N Mean S.D. Min Max 
      
MSA Characteristics      
M&A Event 24,107 0.04 0.20 0 1 
Total Employment (000s) 24,107 216.02 479.45 5.46 6,871.81 
Manufacturing Sector Employment (000s) 24,107 27.86 50.78 0.43 614.84 
Non-tradable Sector Employment (000s) 24,107 47.92 96.96 1.98 1,378.36 
Unemployment Rate (%) 24,107 6.33 2.95 1.10 32.10 
Population (000s) 24,107 658.13 1,397.11 50.86 20,125.35 
Total Labor Force (000s) 24,107 332.40 707.75 20.53 9,983.55 
Per capita Income (2010$) 24,107 35,867.86 7,317.22 16,516.26 109,698.80 
% Manufacturing Employment 24,107 0.16 0.09 0.01 0.56 
% Non-tradable Sector Employment 24,107 0.24 0.05 0.11 0.63 
Manufacturing Sector Quarterly Wage (2010$) 23,851 13,819.34 3,151.57 2,783.96 85,246.79 
Non-tradable Sector Quarterly Wage (2010$) 24,098 6,803.44 965.48 4,536.12 30,243.16 
M&A Events Characteristics      
Value of Transaction (2010$) 282 3,475.15 11,344.07 45.74 117,016.97 












Table 2 Effect of M&As on the Establishment Level Employment: Establishments in 
HQ MSA 
The table presents the effect of M&A deals on employment change at target establishments in the 
headquarters MSAs using establishment-year sample. Target companies from SDC is matched with 
the National Establishment Time Series (NETS) data from 1990 to 2014.  Target is an indicator 
equal to one if an establishment belongs to an M&A target and locates in the headquarters MSAs. 
For each target establishment, a control establishment is selected based on a match on two-digit 
NAICS, employment decile, and sales decile at the year before the deal announcement. If multiple 
control establishments are found, the establishment with the closest employment level with the 
target establishment is selected. I track the employment change of the target and control 
establishments in a [T-3, T+3] window around each merger. Post is an indicator that equals one for 
years after the merger completion. The control variables include establishment age, number of 
branches in the firm, MSA population, average income, and unemployment. T-statistics are 
reported in the parenthesis and the standard errors are clustered at the establishment level. ***, **, 
* denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Log (Employment) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Target 0.041 -0.007 -0.015 
 (0.16) (-0.02) (-0.05) 
Post -0.210*** -0.196*** -0.201*** 
 (-5.72) (-5.19) (-4.90) 
Target × Post -0.097*** -0.155*** -0.153*** 































    
Establishment FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 12,550 12,550 11,617 






Table 3 Effect of M&A Events on Employment Growth in the Manufacturing Sector 
The table presents the effect of M&A Events on employment growth in the manufacturing sector 
(two-digit NAICS 31-33). Observations are MSA-quarters from 1990Q1 to 2016Q4. The 
dependent variable is the annualized three-year employment growth rate. 𝑀&𝐴 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−4,𝑡 is an 
indicator equal to one if an MSA experienced an M&A event in the past four quarters. An M&A 
event is defined when the combined transaction value in a quarter in an MSA is at least two standard 
deviations higher than the time-series mean transaction value in the same MSA. 
%𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑡−4,𝑡 is the annual population growth in the MSA. %𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑡−4,𝑡 
is the annual average income growth in the MSA. High Manufacturing Area is an indicator equal 
to one if the MSA’s share of employment in the manufacturing sector is higher than the national 
median. T-statistics are reported in the parenthesis and the standard errors are clustered at the state 
by time level. ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable: Annualized Three-Year Employment Growth (×100) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
𝑀&𝐴 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−4,𝑡  -0.255*** -0.240*** -0.250*** -0.335*** 
 (-2.87) (-2.61) (-2.72) (-3.50) 
%𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑡−4,𝑡  -11.863*** -11.508*** -12.624*** 
  (-3.31) (-3.25) (-3.11) 
%𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑡−4,𝑡  5.899*** 6.037*** 5.667*** 
  (4.90) (5.01) (4.16) 
High Manufacturing Area   -1.779*** -1.541*** 
   (-19.91) (-15.97) 
     
MSA FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes No 
State-Year-Quarter FE No No No Yes 
Observations 24,107 22,731 22,731 22,731 
Adjusted R2 0.409 0.418 0.428 0.478 











Table 4 Effect of M&A Events on Employment Growth in the Non-tradable Sector 
The table presents the effect of M&A Events on employment growth in the non-tradable sector 
(two-digit NAICS 44-45, 72). Observations are MSA-quarters from 1990Q1 to 2016Q4. The 
dependent variable is the annualized three-year employment growth rate. 𝑀&𝐴 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−4,𝑡 is an 
indicator equal to one if an MSA experienced an M&A event in the past four quarters. An M&A 
event is defined when the combined transaction value in a quarter in an MSA is at least two standard 
deviations higher than the time-series mean transaction value in the same MSA. 
%𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑡−4,𝑡 is the annual population growth of the MSA. %𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑡−4,𝑡 
is the annual average income growth in the MSA. High Manufacturing Area is an indicator equal 
to one if the MSA’s share of employment in the manufacturing sector is higher than the national 
median. T-statistics are reported in the parenthesis and the standard errors are clustered at the state 
by time level. ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable: Annualized Three-Year Employment Growth (×100) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
𝑀&𝐴 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−4,𝑡  -0.103*** -0.115*** -0.114*** -0.109*** 
 (-2.67) (-2.99) (-2.95) (-3.10) 
%𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑡−4,𝑡  5.033** 4.973** 2.847 
  (2.08) (2.06) (1.11) 
%𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑡−4,𝑡  6.282*** 6.259*** 3.535*** 
  (10.95) (10.96) (6.95) 
High Manufacturing Area   0.297*** 0.329*** 
   (8.46) (9.25) 
     
MSA FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes No 
State-Year-Quarter FE No No No Yes 
Observations 24,107 22,731 22,731 22,731 
Adjusted R2 0.381 0.398 0.399 0.495 











Table 5 Robustness Tests 
The table presents robustness tests on the effect of M&A Events on employment growth in the non-
tradable sector (two-digit NAICS 44-45, 72). Observations are MSA-quarters from 1990Q1 to 
2016Q4. The dependent variable is the annualized three-year employment growth rate. 
𝑀&𝐴 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−4,𝑡 is an indicator equal to one if an MSA experienced an M&A event in the past 
four quarters. An M&A event is defined when the combined transaction value in a quarter in an 
MSA is at least two standard deviations higher than the time-series mean transaction value in the 
same MSA. Column (1) reports results estimated using the placebo time of M&A Events. Column 
(2) reports the results estimated after removing overlapping M&A Events. Column (3) reports 
results estimated with the sample excluding years after 2007. Column (4) controls for the MSA 
level exposure to China’s import competition. The MSA level exposure to China’s import 
competition is calculated as the aggregated product of the industry level import flow and industry 
composition of the MSA in 1990. Then the measure is scaled by the national GDP. The data of 
industry level import flow is available between 1991 and 2007 and is downloaded from David 
Dorn’s website (https://www.ddorn.net/data.htm). The control variables include the one-year 
population growth rate, the one-year average income growth rate, and whether the MSA’s share of 
employment in the manufacturing sector is above the national median. T-statistics are reported in 
the parenthesis and the standard errors are clustered at the state by time level. ***, **, * denotes 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable: Annualized Three-Year Employment Growth (×100) 











 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
𝑀&𝐴 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−4,𝑡  -0.022 -0.136*** -0.176*** -0.184*** 
 (-0.55) (-2.82) (-3.10) (-4.34) 
     
China’s Import     -0.129*** 
    (-5.88) 
     
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes 
MSA FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 22,731 22,731 9,352 14,628 






Table 6 2SLS Estimates 
The table presents regression estimates of the two stage least square regressions. Observations are MSA-quarters from 1990Q1 to 2016Q4. 
𝑀&𝐴 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−4,𝑡 is an indicator equal to one if an MSA experienced an M&A event in the past four quarters. An M&A event is defined when the 
combined transaction value in a quarter in an MSA is at least two standard deviations higher than the time-series mean transaction value in the same 
MSA. Columns (1) and (2) report results of the first stage estimation. Local discount is defined as the product of weighted average discount of a 
four-digit NAICS Industry and the local industry presence. Columns (3) and (4) report results of reduced form regressions. Columns (5) to (8) report 
the results from the second stage regressions. The control variables include the one-year population growth rate, the one-year average income growth 
rate, and whether the MSA’s share of employment in the manufacturing sector is above the national median. T-statistics are reported in the 
parenthesis and the standard errors are clustered at the state by time level. ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 
 First Stage Reduced Form Second Stage 







Manufacturing sector Emp 
Growth 
Non-tradable sector Emp 
Growth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Discount -0.017*** -0.018*** 0.353*** 0.102***     
 (-4.76) (-4.79) (5.20) (4.52)     
𝑀&𝐴 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−4,𝑡     -22.159*** -20.099*** -5.710*** -5.831*** 
     (-4.14) (-4.01) (-3.53) (-3.57) 
         
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
MSA FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 22,342 22,342 22,342 22,342 22,293 20,610 22,293 20,610 




Table 7 Local Spillover of M&A Events: Household Level  
The table reports results estimated with individual-year penal data from Survey of Income of 
Program Participation (SIPP) in 1995 and 2003. In Panel A, the dependent variable in the first three 
columns is whether the individual is working in the manufacturing sector. Dependent variable in 
columns (4) to (6) is whether the individual is unemployed. Initial Mfg is defined as a dummy equal 
to one if an individual was working in the manufacturing sector during her first appearance in the 
sample. In Panel B, the dependent variable in the first three columns is whether the individual is 
working in the non-tradable sector. Dependent variable in columns (4) to (6) is whether the 
individual is unemployed. Initial Non-tradable is defined as one if an individual was working in the 
non-tradable sector during her first appearance in the sample. M&A Events is an indicator equal to 
one for MSA-years within 3 years of an M&A Event. The control variables in the table include log 
(MSA labor force), log (MSA average wage), MSA unemployment rate, log(age), college degree, 
married. T-statistics are reported in the parenthesis and the standard errors are clustered at the MSA 
level. ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Individuals Worked in the Manufacturing Sector 
Dep. Var Manufacturing Unemployed 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Initial Mfg ×  
M&A Events 
-0.069*** -0.069*** -0.067*** 0.024*** 0.019** 0.020** 
(-3.53) (-3.48) (-3.36) (3.11) (2.42) (2.48) 
M&A Events 0.006*** 0.007***  -0.001 -0.001  
 (3.50) (3.51)  (-0.27) (-0.36)  
       
Control Variables No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
MSA FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
Year FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
MSA ×Year FE No No Yes No No Yes 
Individual FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 258,260 258,260 258,260 258,260 258,260 258,260 











Table 7 Continued 
Panel B: Individuals Worked in the Non-tradable Sector  
Dep. Var Non-tradable Unemployed 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Initial Non-tradable ×  
M&A Events 
-0.098*** -0.098*** -0.099*** 0.037*** 0.044*** 0.044*** 
(-4.44) (-4.44) (-4.45) (3.61) (4.17) (4.19) 
M&A Events 0.016*** 0.016***  -0.004 -0.006  
 (3.71) (3.72)  (-0.96) (-1.46)  
       
Control Variables No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
MSA FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
Year FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
MSA × Year FE No No Yes No No Yes 
Individual FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 258,260 258,260 258,260 258,260 258,260 258,260 








Table 8 Wage and Mobility  
The table presents the effect of M&A Events on the wage and employment mobility. Observations 
in Panel A are MSA-quarters from 1990Q1 to 2016Q4. 𝑀&𝐴 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−4,𝑡 is an indicator equal to 
one if an MSA experienced an M&A event in the past four quarters. An M&A event is defined 
when the combined transaction value in a quarter in an MSA is at least two standard deviations 
higher than the time-series mean transaction value in the same MSA. Columns (1) and (2) of Panel 
A report the effect of M&A Events on the annualized three-year growth rate of average quarterly 
wage in the manufacturing sector (two-digit NAICS 31-33) and the non-tradable sector (two-digit 
NAICS 44-45, 72). Column (3) of Panel A reports the effect of M&A Events on total payroll growth 
in the non-tradable sector. Panel B reports the effect of M&A Events on annualized three-year 
population growth, labor force growth and net migration inflow respectively estimated with MSA-
annual data. Net migration inflow is obtained from IRS tax filing data and is measured as net 
migration inflow per 100 people. The control variables include the one-year population growth rate, 
the one-year average income growth rate, and whether the MSA’s share of employment in the 
manufacturing sector is above the national median. T-statistics are reported in the parenthesis and 
the standard errors are clustered at the state by time level. ***, **, * denotes statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable: Annualized Three-Year Growth (×100) 
 









 (1) (2) (3) 
    
𝑀&𝐴 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−4,𝑡  -0.203** -0.162*** -0.238*** 
 (-2.33) (-4.17) (-4.39) 
    
Control Yes Yes Yes 
MSA FE Yes Yes Yes 
State-Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 21,019 21,270 22,707 
Adjusted R2 0.304 0.751 0.698 
Panel B: Mobility Change 
 Population Total Labor 
Force 
Net Inflow 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
𝑀&𝐴 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−4,𝑡  -0.065* -0.184*** -0.237** 
 (-1.92) (-2.75) (-2.47) 
    
Control Yes Yes Yes 
MSA FE Yes Yes Yes 
State-Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,758 5,758 4,734 





Table 9 Merger Spillovers: MSA Heterogeneity  
The table presents the effect of M&A Events on employment/wage growth in the non-tradable 
sector (two-digit NAICS 44-45, 72) across MSAs with high and low dependence on the 
manufacturing sector. Observations are MSA-quarters from 1990Q1 to 2016Q4. The dependent 
variable is the annualized three-year employment/wage growth rate. 𝑀&𝐴 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−4,𝑡  is an 
indicator equal to one if an MSA experienced an M&A event in the past four quarters. An M&A 
event is defined when the combined transaction value in a quarter in an MSA is at least two standard 
deviations higher than the time-series mean transaction value in the same MSA. Dependence on 
the manufacturing sector is defined as 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑖,𝑡/𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑖,𝑡. 
Columns (1) and (2) report the employment/ wage growth when the MSA’s dependence on the 
manufacturing sector is above the national median. Columns (3) and (4) report the employment/ 
wage growth when the MSA’s dependence on the manufacturing sector is below the national 
median. The control variables include the one-year population growth rate, the one-year average 
income growth rate, and whether the MSA’s share of employment in the manufacturing sector is 
above the national median. T-statistics are reported in the parenthesis and the standard error is 
clustered at the state by time level. ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable: Annualized Three-Year Growth (×100) 
 Dependence on the Manufacturing Sector 
 High Low 
 Emp Wage Emp Wage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
𝑀&𝐴 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−4,𝑡  -0.199*** -0.249*** 0.025 -0.041 
 (-3.63) (-4.04) (0.53) (-0.69) 
     
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes 
MSA FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 10,378 9,920 11,388 10,602 










Table 10 Merger Spillovers: Deal Heterogeneity  
The table presents the effect of M&A Events on employment/wage growth in the non-tradable 
sector (two-digit NAICS 44-45, 72) across different types of deals. Observations are MSA-quarters 
from 1990Q1 to 2016Q4. The dependent variable is the annualized three-year employment/wage 
growth rate. 𝑀&𝐴 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−4,𝑡 is an indicator equal to one if an MSA experienced an M&A event 
in the past four quarters. An M&A event is defined when the combined transaction value in a 
quarter in an MSA is at least two standard deviations higher than the time-series mean transaction 
value in the same MSA. % 𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 is the percentage of deal value that is from horizontal deals 
in an M&A Event. 𝐼(𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙) is an indicator equal one if more than 50% of the combined deal 
value in an M&A event is from horizontal deals. The control variables include the one-year 
population growth rate, the one-year average income growth rate, and whether the MSA’s share of 
employment in the manufacturing sector is above the national median. T-statistics are reported in 
the parenthesis and the standard errors are clustered at the state by time level. ***, **, * denotes 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable: Annualized Three-Year Employment Growth (×100) 
 Emp Wage Emp Wage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
𝑀&𝐴 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−4,𝑡 0.029 -0.228*** 0.033 -0.190*** 
 (0.54) (-3.37) (0.63) (-2.88) 
𝑀&𝐴 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−4,𝑡
× % 𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 
-0.242*** 0.091   
(-3.28) (1.05)   
𝑀&𝐴 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−4,𝑡
× 𝐼(𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙) 
  -0.250*** 0.026 
  (-3.47) (0.30) 
     
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
MSA FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 22,563 21,270 22,563 21,270 











Table 11 Labor Protection and Spillover Effect  
The table presents the effect of M&A Events on employment/wage growth in across states with 
different levels of minimum wage. Observations are MSA-quarters from 1990Q1 to 2016Q4. The 
dependent variable is the annualized three-year employment/wage growth rate. 𝑀&𝐴 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−4,𝑡 
is an indicator equal to one if an MSA experienced an M&A event in the past four quarters. An 
M&A event is defined when the combined transaction value in a quarter in an MSA is at least two 
standard deviations higher than the time-series mean transaction value in the same MSA. Columns 
(1) and (2) report changes in employment growth in the manufacturing sector (two-digit NAICS 
31-33) and columns (3) and (4) report changes in employment growth in the non-tradable sector 
(two-digit NAICS 44-45, 72). Columns (5) and (6) report regression estimates on wage growth in 
the non-tradable sector. High and low minimum wage is defined based on whether the state’s 
minimum wage level is higher than the federal minimum wage. The control variables include the 
one-year population growth rate, the one-year average income growth rate, and whether the MSA’s 
share of employment in the manufacturing sector is above the national median. T-statistics are 
reported in the parenthesis and the standard errors are clustered at the state level. ***, **, * denotes 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Annualized Three-Year Growth (×100) 
    






 High Low High Low High Low 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
𝑀&𝐴 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−4,𝑡  -0.436*** -0.348* -0.287*** -0.093 0.045 -0.589*** 
 (-3.87) (-1.82) (-5.70) (-0.99) (0.44) (-2.92) 
       
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
MSA FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-Year-Quarter 
FE 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 14,944 6,178 14,944 6,178 14,943 6,136 













A1. Theoretical Model  
In this section, I use a simple model to illustrate how mergers in the manufacturing 
sector could affect employment in the local non-tradable sector. Consider an MSA with 
only two sectors: a manufacturing sector and a non-tradable sector. I use capital letters to 
denote the variables associated with the manufacturing sector and lowercase letters for the 
variables associated with the non-tradable sector. There are N producers in the 
manufacturing sector and n producers in the non-tradable sector. As different skill sets are 
needed in the non-tradable sector and the manufacturing sector, the labor markets for the 
two sectors are segmented. I assume that the manufacturing sector has an increasing and 
convex labor supply curve. Specifically, that the inverse labor supply curve is 𝑊(𝐿) =
 𝑊0  +  𝛼𝐿
𝑀 , where M ≥ 1. For simplicity, each producer in the manufacturing sector 
produces only one product and the product i is traded nationally at a nation-wide fixed 
price of Pi. Without loss of generality, I assume that the only production input is labor and 
the production function in the manufacturing sector is given by the function 𝑄𝑖 =  𝐶𝑖𝐿𝑖, 
where 𝐶𝑖  measures the fixed assets used in production and cannot be easily adjusted. 
However, the local labor market is oligopsonistic, where producers in the manufacturing 
sector make employment decisions, knowing that the number of employees they hire has 
an impact on the market wage. (See Boal et al., 1997 for a literature survey on monopsony 
in the labor market.) Hence, producer i’s profit maximization problem is:  
max
𝐿𝑖




where 𝐿 = ∑ 𝐿𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 .  








.                                        (A2) 









 .                                                     (A3) 
Proposition 1. The aggregate employment in the manufacturing sector is positively related 
to the fixed assets each firm uses in production.  














𝑃𝑖 > 0.                                         (A4)       
Now consider that there is an M&A deal where firm j is the target. The acquirer of the 
merger deal then chooses the post-merger allocation of fixed assets to the target 𝐶𝑗
′ by 
comparing the marginal return of fixed assets at the acquiring and target companies. Then 
the change in the aggregate employment will be affected by the acquirer’s decisions on the 
allocation of production assets. For example, if the acquirer firm increases investment by 
allocating more assets in the local area (𝐶𝑗
′ > 𝐶𝑗), there will be an ex-post increase in 
aggregate employment. However, of acquirers decide to reallocate the production fixed 
assets to produce other products (𝐶𝑗
′ < 𝐶𝑗 ), then the aggregate employment will decrease. 
Finally, consider the extreme case that the acquirer company decides to reallocate all of the 
production assets of the target (𝐶𝑗




N – 1 after the merger), then it can be shown that the total employment, L decreases if 𝑃𝑖 
is reasonably large or the convexity of the wage function, M, is large enough. Since W(L) 
is an increasing function of L, if L decreases, W will decrease. As a result, the total labor 
income in the manufacturing sector, 𝐼 = 𝑊 × 𝐿 will decrease.  
The change in employment in the manufacturing sector then diffuses to the non-
tradable sector through fluctuations in total labor income. Producers in the non-tradable 
sector compete for local businesses; hence, I model the non-tradable sector competition as 
a Cournot oligopoly game. For simplicity, I assume that each unit of labor produces one 
unit of good in the non-tradable sector. Producers choose production quantity, 𝑙𝑖, and the 
price, p, is determined by 𝑝 = 𝑎(𝐼) − 𝑏(𝐼) ∑ 𝑙𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 , where 𝑎(𝐼)  >  0  and 𝑏(𝐼)  >  0 . I 
assume 𝑎(𝐼) is increasing in I and 𝑏(𝐼) is decreasing in I to capture the dependence of the 
non-tradable sector on local demand. If total labor income in the manufacturing sector 
decreases, local demand decreases, indicated by a lower 𝑎(𝐼) and higher 𝑏(𝐼). The inverse 
labor supply curve for the non-tradable sector is 𝑤(𝑙)  =  𝑤0  + 𝛽𝑙
𝑚, where 𝑚 ≥  0. The 
Nash equilibrium solution of the Cournot oligopoly game is standard. Producer i’s profit 
maximization problem is:  
max
𝑙𝑖
π𝑖  = (𝑝 − 𝑤(𝑙))𝑙𝑖.                                              (A5) 






.                                              (A6) 







.                                              (A7) 
Proposition 2. The aggregate employment in the non-tradable sector is positively related 
to the total income I.  




,                                            (A8) 
and re-arranging equation (A8) gives us  
(𝑛 + 1)𝑏(𝐼)𝑙 + (𝑚 + 𝑛)𝛽𝑙𝑚 = 𝑛𝑎(𝐼) − 𝑛𝑤0.                            (A9)  
Let 𝐹(𝑙, 𝐼) = (𝑛 + 1)𝑏(𝐼)𝑙 + (𝑚 + 𝑛)𝛽𝑙𝑚 − 𝑛𝑎(𝐼) + 𝑛𝑤0 = 0 . Applying the implicit 
function theorem to solve for  
𝜕𝑙
𝜕𝐼









> 0.                            (A10) 
Total employment in the non-tradable sector is increasing in I, hence, the employment 










Figure A1 Share of Employments in the Manufacturing Sector Over Time 
 
 
Figure A1 presents the share of employment in the manufacturing sector in the U.S. from 
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Table A1 Employment Concentration 
The table reports the employment concentration at the acquirer/target headquarters MSAs. The data 
on the employment is from the Publicly Listed National Establishment Time Series (NETS). The 
observations are from 1990 to 2014. Both acquirers and targets are publicly traded firms from the 
manufacturing sector (two-digit NAICS code 31-33). % Emp at Hq MSA is the percentage of the 
target employment that is in the headquarters MSA. I(Headquarters MSA is the highest) is an 
indicator equal to one if a company’s employment at its headquarters MSA is the highest among 
all regions that the company operates. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 N Mean S.D. Min Max 
Acquirers      
Emp at Headquarters MSA 569 3,516 5,910 7 35,037 
Emp at Other MSA 569 13,324 25,767 0 169,566 
Total Emp 569 16,816 28,452 20 175,739 
% Emp at Hq MSA 569 0.386 0.302 0.0035 1 
I(HQ MSA is the highest) 569 0.598 0.491 0 1 
Targets      
Emp at Headquarters MSA 569 898.5 1,852 3 13,457 
Emp at Other MSA 569 1,924 4,496 0 27,926 
Total Employment 569 2,905 6,068 3 38,781 
% Emp at Hq MSA 569 0.582 0.349 0.00792 1 
















Table A2 Summary Statistics: Establishment Level 
The table presents the summary statistics at the establishment level for tests reported in table 2. 
Target companies from SDC is matched with the National Establishment Time Series (NETS) data 
from 1990 to 2014. Age is the age of the establishment. Number of Branches measures the number 
of branches of the company. Population, Average Income and Unemployment are all at the MSA 
level. All wages, incomes and market values are in 2010 dollars. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 N Mean S.D. Min Max 
Establishments at HQ MSA 
      
Employment 12,558 321.10 471.81 0 2,500 
Age 12,558 10.29 5.24 1 25 
Number of Branches 12,558 165.05 432.52 1 10,997 
Population 11,631 4,979,709.03 5,625,054.54 50,46 20,125,35 
Average Income (2010$) 11,631 42,265.31 8,560.27 16,516.26 105,361.33 


















Table A3 Summary Statistics: Household Level 
The table reports the summary statistics of the household level sample. The data is from Survey of 
Income and Program Participation (SIPP) from 1995 to 2003. Individuals with age below 16 or 
above 70 are dropped from the sample. College is an indicator equal to one if the individual 
achieved college degree or higher. Employed is an indicator equal to one if the individual is 
employed. Manufacturing is an indicator equal to one if the individual is working in manufacturing 
sector (two-digit NAICS code 31-33). Non-tradable is an indicator equal to one if the individual is 
working in non-tradable sector (two-digit NAICS code 44-45, 72). 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 N Mean S.D. Min Max 
      
Individual Characteristics 
      
Age 292,872 39.77 14.46 16 70 
Employed 292,872 0.73 0.45 0 1 
Married 292,872 0.53 0.50 0 1 
College Degree 292,872 0.02 0.12 0 1 
Manufacturing 292,872 0.09 0.29 0.00 1 
Non-tradable 292,872 0.12 0.33 0.00 1 
      
MSA Characteristics 
 
Population 292,872 5,312,092.19 5,685,703.84 118,796 19,248,312 
Average Income (in 2010$) 292,872 35,908.96 7,037.70 18,271 53,199 
Total Labor Force 292,872 2,667,367.58 2,757,754.39 64,538.62 9,339,938 
Unemployment 292,872 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.20 











Table A4 Total Employment Change 
The table presents the effect of M&A Events on the total employment growth. Observations are 
MSA-quarters from 1990Q1 to 2016Q4. The dependent variable is the annualized three-year 
employment growth rate. 𝑀&𝐴 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−4,𝑡 is an indicator equal to one if an MSA experienced an 
M&A event in the past four quarters. An M&A event is defined when the combined transaction 
value in a quarter in an MSA is at least two standard deviations higher than the time-series mean 
transaction value in the same MSA. %𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑡−4,𝑡 is the annual population growth 
in the MSA. %𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑡−4,𝑡  is the annual average income growth in the MSA. High 
Manufacturing Area is an indicator equal to one if the MSA’s share of employment in the 
manufacturing sector is higher than the national median. T-statistics are reported in the parenthesis 
and the standard errors are clustered at the state by time level. ***, **, * denotes statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable: Annualized Three-Year Employment Growth (×100) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
𝑀&𝐴 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−4,𝑡  -0.191*** -0.183*** -0.184*** -0.146*** 
 (-4.96) (-4.62) (-4.64) (-3.96) 
%𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑡−4,𝑡  -1.422 -1.405 -3.163 
  (-0.65) (-0.64) (-1.61) 
%𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑡−4,𝑡  6.223*** 6.229*** 4.025*** 
  (7.87) (7.86) (5.17) 
High Manufacturing Area   -0.086** 0.012 
   (-2.46) (0.34) 
     
MSA FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes No 
State-Year-Quarter FE No No No Yes 
Observations 24,107 22,731 22,731 22,563 














Table A5 Additional Robustness Check 
The table presents results of additional robustness tests. Observations are MSA-quarters from 
1990Q1 to 2016Q4. Columns (1) to (4) repeat baseline regressions with alternative definitions of 
M&A Events. In column (1) an M&A Event is defined as one if the combined transaction value in 
a quarter in an MSA is at least one standard deviation higher than the time-series mean transaction 
value in the same MSA. In column (2) an M&A Event is defined as one if the combined transaction 
value in a quarter in an MSA is at least three standard deviations higher than the time-series mean 
transaction value in the same MSA.  In column (3) an M&A Event is defined when the transaction 
value in a quarter is the highest within the MSA during the sample period. In column (4) an M&A 
Event is defined as the logarithm of combined transaction value of the last four quarters. In column 
(5), the employment growth is measured by the annualized five-year growth rate. The control 
variables include the one-year population growth rate, the one-year average income growth rate, 
and whether the MSA’s share of employment in the manufacturing sector is above the national 
median. T-statistics are reported in the parenthesis and the standard errors are clustered at the state 
by time level. ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable: Annualized Employment Growth (×100) 







 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A: Manufacturing Sector Employment Growth 
 
𝑀&𝐴 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−4,𝑡 -0.249*** -0.333*** -0.450*** -0.034*** -0.731*** 
 (-2.83) (-3.15) (-3.48) (-2.75) (-5.52) 
      
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
MSA FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 22,731 22,731 22,731 22,731 19,841 
Adjusted R2 0.478 0.478 0.479 0.478 0.562 
Panel B: Non-tradable Sector Employment Growth 
      
𝑀&𝐴 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−4,𝑡 -0.140*** -0.167*** -0.189*** -0.018*** -0.123** 
 (-4.34) (-4.26) (-3.80) (-3.81) (-2.25) 
      
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
MSA FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 22,731 22,731 22,731 22,731 19,841 
Adjusted R2 0.495 0.495 0.495 0.495 0.637 
 
 
